• Corpus ID: 18733548

Side Channels, Compromising Emanations and Surveillance: Current and future technologies

@inproceedings{Frankland2011SideCC,
  title={Side Channels, Compromising Emanations and Surveillance: Current and future technologies},
  author={Richard Frankland},
  year={2011}
}
Side channel attacks exploit implementation-specific information leakage to defeat cryptographic measures, usually designed to provide confidentiality. The majority of published attacks require physical possession or network access to the target device, and as such are not suitable for implementation by an attacker wishing to carry out a remote, passive and undetectable attack. Surveillance techniques can be applied to compromising emanations, which is effectively side channel leakage from… 

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