Should Institutions Prioritize Rectification over Aid?


Should an institutional scheme prioritize the rectification or compensation of harms it has wrongfully caused over provision of aid to persons it has not harmed? Some who think so rely on an analogy with the view that persons should give higher priority to rectification than to aid. Inference from the personal view to the institutional view would be warranted if either (i) the correct moral principles for institutional assessment are nearest possible equivalents of the correct personal moral principles, or (ii) the moral principles which ground the personal view also ground the institutional view. Neither claim can be justified. I briefly assess some alternative ways of defending the view that institutions should prioritize rectification over aid.

Cite this paper

@article{Douglas2010ShouldIP, title={Should Institutions Prioritize Rectification over Aid?}, author={Thomas M Douglas}, journal={The Philosophical quarterly}, year={2010}, volume={60 241}, pages={698-717} }