Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

  title={Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion},
  author={Neri Marsili and Alex Wiegmann},

Figures from this paper

Lying: Knowledge or belief?
A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of
Two accounts of assertion
In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account and the justified belief account. When it comes to the evidence that is typically used to assess accounts of
Truth: The Rule or the Aim of Assertion?
Is truth the rule or the aim of assertion? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to
Norms of assertion in the United States, Germany, and Japan
  • Markus Kneer
  • Philosophy
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • 2021
In the largest cross-cultural study to date on misinformation, findings from the United States, Germany, and Japan suggest that, in order to claim that x, x need not be known, and it can be false.


Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion
Introduction 1. Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm 2. Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability 3. Having False Reasons 4. On Knowing One's Reason 5. Knowledge versus Truth
Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries
The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
  • J. Turri
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2013
Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology
Centuries ago, Descartes and Locke initiated a foundational debate in epistemology over the relationship between knowledge, on the one hand, and practical factors, on the other. Descartes claimed
Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion
  • J. Turri
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2020
This paper advances the understanding of the norms of assertion by evaluating whether it was due to stimuli mentioning that a speaker’s evidence was fallible, and evaluating the hypothesis that assertion has a truth-insensitive standard of justification.
The distinctive “should” of assertability
Abstract Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
The view that assertions are governed by the rule that we should assert only what we know, is enjoying growing popularity. This paper argues that it is more plausible to assume that assertions are
What Norm of Assertion?
I argue that the debates over which norm constitutes assertion can be abandoned by challenging the three main motivations for a constitutive norm. The first motivation is the alleged analogy between
Knowledge and Assertion in Korean
Three experiments on Koreans in Korean supported the theory that there is a core, cross-culturally robust human practice of assertion and that, according to the rules of this practice, assertions should express knowledge.
Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases
Abstract Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. By asserting, we share knowledge, coordinate behavior, and advance collective inquiry. Accordingly, assertion is of