Should Evolution Necessarily be Egolution?

  title={Should Evolution Necessarily be Egolution?},
  author={Evgeny Ivanko},

Figures and Tables from this paper



Evolution of cooperative strategies from first principles

The results indicate that cooperative strategies can evolve even under such minimalist assumptions, provided that agents are capable of perceiving heritable external markers of other agents.

The evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models

A synthetic conceptual framework is developed that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation and classifies them into four general categories.

Beyond society: the evolution of organismality

This survey suggests that many of the traits commonly used to define organisms are not essential, including physical contiguity, indivisibility, clonality or high relatedness, development from a single cell, short-term and long-term genetic cotransmission, germ–soma separation and membership in the same species.

The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I.

The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.

The evolution of eusociality

It is argued that standard natural selection theory in the context of precise models of population structure represents a simpler and superior approach, allows the evaluation of multiple competing hypotheses, and provides an exact framework for interpreting empirical observations.

Investigating Biological Assumptions through Radical Reimplementation

This work reviews examples that can be interpreted through the lens of radical reimplementation to yield potential insights into biology despite having purposely unnatural experimental setups and can help renew the relevance of computational systems for investigating biological theory and act as a practical philosophical tool to help separate the fundamental features of terrestrial biology from the epiphenomenal.

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

  • R. Trivers
  • Psychology
    The Quarterly Review of Biology
  • 1971
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the

The evolution of cooperation.

A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.

Group selection and the evolution of altruism

"Group selection" is often cited as an explanation for the survival of altruism. The idea of group selection is a controversial one - much effort has been expended on its justification (and