Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting

@inproceedings{Rey2021ShortlistingRA,
  title={Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting},
  author={Simon Rey and Ulle Endriss and Ronald de Haan},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2021}
}
We introduce an end-to-end model for participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. Our model accounts for the interplay between the two stages commonly encountered in real-life partici- patory budgeting. In the first stage participants pro- pose projects to be shortlisted, while in the second stage they vote on which of the shortlisted projects should be funded. Prior work of a formal nature has focused on analysing the second stage only. We in- troduce several shortlisting… Expand
2 Citations
Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences
TLDR
This study considers PB in which voters may be asymmetric, and they report ordinal preferences over projects, and proposes proportional representation axioms for the setting and clarifies how they fit into other preference aggregation settings. Expand

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