Shifting power, preventive logic, and the response of the target: Germany, Russia, and the First World War

  title={Shifting power, preventive logic, and the response of the target: Germany, Russia, and the First World War},
  author={Jack S. Levy and William Mulligan},
  journal={Journal of Strategic Studies},
  pages={731 - 769}
ABSTRACT If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to… Expand
18 Citations
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