Shedding Light on Time

  title={Shedding Light on Time},
  author={Craig Callender},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={S587 - S599}
  • C. Callender
  • Published 1 September 2000
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
Throughout this century many philosophers and physicists have gone for the 'big kill' regarding tenses. They have tried to show via McTaggart's paradox and special relativity that tenses are logically and physically impossible, respectively. Neither attempt succeeds, though as I argue, both leave their mark. In the first two sections of the paper I introduce some conceptual difficulties for the tensed theory of time. The next section then discusses the standing of tenses in light of special… 
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