Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally

@inproceedings{Klimm2014SharingNC,
  title={Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally},
  author={Max Klimm and Daniel Schmand},
  booktitle={International/Italian Conference on Algorithms and Complexity},
  year={2014}
}
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of resources is used by a heterogeneous set of selfish users. The cost of a resource is a non-decreasing function of the set of its users. Under the assumption that the costs of the resources are shared by uniform cost sharing protocols, i.e., protocols that use only… 

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