Shared Intention

  title={Shared Intention},
  author={Michael E. Bratman},
  pages={97 - 113}
In Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action Alan Donagan argued for the importance of "will" to our shared understanding of intelligent action.1 By "will" Donagan meant a complex of capacities for forming, changing, retaining, and sometimes abandoning our choices and intentions. (Choice is, for Donagan, a "determinate variety of intending.")2 Our capacity to intend is to be distinguished both from our capacity to believe and from our capacity to be moved by desires. And Donagan thought… Expand
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