• Corpus ID: 235727453

Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules

  title={Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules},
  author={Vitor Bosshard and Sven Seuken},
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders’ Shapley values. We define a sensitivity metric, and provide analytical results for this metric in LLG, for six different payment vectors used as reference points for minimum-revenue core-selecting payment rules. We furthermore show how this sensitivity affects the derivative of the resulting… 

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