Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery)

  title={Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery)},
  author={Hans Rott and Maurice Pagnucco},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the incorporation of new… 
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Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems
  • H. Rott
  • Philosophy
    J. Philos. Log.
  • 1991
The theory of nonmonotonic reasoning and the theory of belief revision share a very important subject: how it is possible rationally to pass from one knowledge system into another knowledge system that is in contradiction with the former one.
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