Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction

@article{Mayo2006SevereTA,
  title={Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction},
  author={D. Mayo and A. Spanos},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  year={2006},
  volume={57},
  pages={323 - 357}
}
  • D. Mayo, A. Spanos
  • Published 2006
  • Mathematics
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We… Expand
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