Corpus ID: 220496590

Settling the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

@article{Barman2020SettlingTP,
  title={Settling the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods},
  author={Siddharth Barman and Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2007.06242}
}
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness constraints. While initially studied for divisible goods, recent work on the price of fairness also studies the setting of indivisible goods. In this paper, we resolve the price of two well-studied fairness notions for the allocation of indivisible goods: envy… Expand
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This paper investigates the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept, and provides tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying notions with guaranteed existence, including envy-freeness up to one good, balancedness, maximum Nash welfare, and leximin. Expand
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