Settling Old Scores

@article{Sutter1995SettlingOS,
  title={Settling Old Scores},
  author={Daniel Sutter},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  year={1995},
  volume={39},
  pages={110 - 128}
}
  • D. Sutter
  • Published 1 March 1995
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Under certain conditions both the opponents and supporters of an authoritarian regime can benefit from the peaceful liberalization of the regime. The literature on transitions to democracy emphasizes the role of negotiated deals (pacts) in facilitating transitions. Political deals are not legally enforceable contracts; they are subject to opportunism by one of the parties. I examine how punishment of the ex-ruler(s) by a successor government after power has been transferred renders a pact… 
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