Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies

  title={Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies},
  author={Carles Boix},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={609 - 624}
  • C. Boix
  • Published 1 September 1999
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
Looking at the history of democracies in the developed world, I show that electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. As long as the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences), the ruling parties modify the electoral… 

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