Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness

  title={Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness},
  author={Felix Brandt},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly’s preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former are preferred to all elements of the latter. It is shown that set-monotonicity—a new variant of Maskin-monotonicity—implies Kellystrategyproofness in comprehensive subdomains of the linear domain. Interestingly, there are a handful of appealing Condorcet… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 20 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 31 references

Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes

A. Gibbard
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Consistency, rationality and collective choice

G. Bordes
Review of Economic Studies, • 1976
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Theory of Choice, volume 38 of Studies in Mathematical and Managerial Economics

M. Aizerman, F. Aleskerov
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Manipulation of non-imposed, non-oligarchic, non-binary group decision rules

T. Bandyopadhyay
Economics Letters, • 1983
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Multi-valued decision rules and coalitional non-manipulability

T. Bandyopadhyay
Economics Letters, • 1983
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Manipulation of social decision functions

S. Barberà
Journal of Economic Theory, • 1977
View 8 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave “too much

S. Barberà
to chance. Econometrica, • 1977
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Rational selection of decision functions

H. Chernoff
Welfare, • 2013

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…