Set Theory and Nominalization, Part I

@article{Kamareddine1992SetTA,
  title={Set Theory and Nominalization, Part I},
  author={Fairouz Kamareddine},
  journal={J. Log. Comput.},
  year={1992},
  volume={2},
  pages={579-604}
}
This paper argues that the basic problems of nominalisation are those of set theory. We shall therefore overview the problems of set theory, the various solutions and assess the influence on nominalisation. We shall then discuss Aczel's Frege structures and compare them with Scott domains. Moreover, we shall set the ground for the second part which demonstrates that Frege structures are a suitable framework for dealing with nominalisation. 

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