Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains

  title={Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains},
  author={J. Lang and Lirong Xia},
  journal={Math. Soc. Sci.},
  • J. Lang, Lirong Xia
  • Published 2009
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Math. Soc. Sci.
  • In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues). Dealing with such domains leads to the following well-known dilemma: either ask the voters to vote separately on each issue, which may lead to the so-called multiple election paradoxes as soon as voters' preferences are not separable; or allow voters to express their full preferences on the set of all combinations of values… CONTINUE READING
    120 Citations
    Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
    • 30
    • PDF
    Issue-by-issue voting : an experimental evaluation
    • 5
    • PDF
    Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains
    • 6
    • PDF
    Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach
    • 15
    • PDF
    Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections
    • 27
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
    • 46
    • PDF
    Bribery in Voting With Soft Constraints
    • 19
    • PDF
    Multi-Agent Soft Constraint Aggregation via Sequential Voting
    • 25
    • PDF


    Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences
    • J. Lang
    • Mathematics, Computer Science
    • IJCAI
    • 2007
    • 60
    • PDF
    Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies
    • 57
    • PDF
    Strongly Decomposable Voting Rules on Multiattribute Domains
    • 33
    • PDF
    A Problem with Referendums
    • 126
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    The paradox of multiple elections
    • 162
    • Highly Influential
    Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
    • J. Lang
    • Mathematics, Computer Science
    • Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
    • 2004
    • 160
    • PDF
    Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
    • 32
    • PDF
    Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
    • 54