Sequential Information Design

@article{Doval2020SequentialID,
  title={Sequential Information Design},
  author={Laura Doval and Jeffrey C. Ely},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={2020},
  volume={88},
  pages={2575-2608}
}
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players’ private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the… 
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