Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division

@inproceedings{Bloch1996SequentialFO,
  title={Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division},
  author={Francis Bloch},
  year={1996}
}
This paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure. Gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors. I show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game. If stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games, a simple condition is… CONTINUE READING
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