• Corpus ID: 5341486

Sequential Equilibria Author ( s ) :

  title={Sequential Equilibria Author ( s ) :},
  author={David M. Kreps and Robert B. Wilson},
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Refinements of Nash Equilibrium Equilibria with Simple Features

  • Economics
This entry describes ways that the definition of an equilibrium among players' strategies in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision theory. Refinements of John

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The present paper considers four properties of choice frames and shows that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state of all the players.


The present dissertation consists of three independent essays on Game Theory and its applications to Economics. The first essay compares two standard notions of rational choice under uncertainty:

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We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no

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In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is characterized by two properties: (i) it provides a unified framework for both backwards and forward

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A systematic monotonic relationship between an agent’s beliefs and optimal behavior under a particular moment-based ordering of its beliefs is observed and a spread-accumulatetechnique of sampling an agent's higher order belief is presented by generating “evenly dispersed” beliefs for which the authors (pre)compute offline solutions.

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Finding a general method to identify equilibria in repeated games with observation errors (repeated games with “private monitoring”) is a longstanding open problem in game theory and theoretical

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Extending the alternating-offers protocol in the presence of competition: models and theoretical analysis

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  • Economics
    Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
  • 2009
A model that extends the alternating-offers protocol to include competition among agents and shows that a simple refinement of the agents’ utility functions leads to equilibrium uniqueness is provided.


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1. General Introduction.- 1.1. Informal description of games and game theory.- 1.2. Dynamic programming.- 1.3. Subgame perfect equilibria.- 1.4. Sequential equilibria and perfect equilibria.- 1.5.

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Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria

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