Sequential Elimination Contests with All-Pay Auctions

  title={Sequential Elimination Contests with All-Pay Auctions},
  author={Fupeng Sun and Yanwei Sun and Chiwei Yan and Li Jin},
By modeling contests as all-pay auctions, we study two-stage sequential elimination contests (SEC) under incomplete information, where only the players with top efforts in the first stage can proceed to the second and final stage to compete for prizes. Players have privately held type/ability information that impacts their costs of exerting efforts. We characterize players’ Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium strategies and discover a somewhat surprising result: all players exert weakly lower efforts in… 

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