Sequential Decisions with Tests

@article{Gill2008SequentialDW,
  title={Sequential Decisions with Tests},
  author={D. Gill and D. Sgroi},
  journal={ERN: Non-Cooperative Games (Topic)},
  year={2008}
}
  • D. Gill, D. Sgroi
  • Published 2008
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • ERN: Non-Cooperative Games (Topic)
We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal wishes to be endorsed by a sequence of agents, but cannot truthfully reveal type. In the standard "herding" model, the agents learn from each other's decisions, which can lead to cascades on a given decision when later agents' private information is swamped. We augment the standard model to allow the principal to subject herself to a test designed to provide public information about her type. She must decide how tough a test to attempt… Expand
Test design under voluntary participation
Bayesian Persuasion with Optimal Learning†
Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism
Persuasive Signalling
Persuading Skeptics and Reaffirming Believers∗
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
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