Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

@article{Grossman1986SequentialBU,
  title={Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information},
  author={Sanford J. Grossman and Motty Perry},
  journal={Wharton School: Finance (Topic)},
  year={1986}
}
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This paper presents a simple, multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused. If rejected, the process continues. How the seller's ability to
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Etude d'un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete. Caracterisation d'une classe d'equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality Author(s): Sanford J. Grossman Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, Consumer Protection Regulation:
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