Separation of Powers and Political Accountability

  title={Separation of Powers and Political Accountability},
  author={Torsten Persson and Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree… 

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