Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market

  title={Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market},
  author={Shelly Lundberg and Robert A Pollak},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={988 - 1010}
This paper introduces the "separate spheres" bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models (e.g., Manser-Brown, McElroy-Horney) in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to… 
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