Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas

  title={Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas},
  author={A. Szigeti},
It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analysing the emotional response of the agent is the… Expand
2 Citations
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  • Medicine, Psychology
  • Psychological review
  • 2001
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