Semi-device-independent security of one-way quantum key distribution

@article{Pawowski2011SemideviceindependentSO,
  title={Semi-device-independent security of one-way quantum key distribution},
  author={Marcin Pawłowski and Nicolas Brunner},
  journal={Physical Review A},
  year={2011},
  volume={84},
  pages={010302}
}
By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being ``device-independent.'' Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the devices used by the trusted parties are noncharacterized, but… 

Figures from this paper

Semi-device-independent QKD Based on BB84 and a CHSH-Type Estimation

TLDR
This work introduces a semi-device-independent QKD scheme in the prepare-and-measure configuration where the only assumption is a bound on the dimension of the Hilbert space, and proves its security against collective attacks.

Finite-key bound for semi-device-independent quantum key distribution.

TLDR
This paper proposes a practical SDI prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol, and introduces min entropy for security proof, to obtain a security bound under the practical condition with finite resources.

Semi-device-independent quantum key distribution based on a coherence equality

TLDR
The first example of a semi-device-independent quantum key distribution (SDIQKD) protocol with a classical Alice and Bob is introduced, showing the protocol to be semi- device-independent since the only trusted operations occur in the users’ labs, and establishing security against an adversary with bounded quantum memory.

Security of a practical semi-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks

TLDR
This work proposes a practical SDI-QKD protocol with four preparation states and three measurement bases by considering the maximal violation of dimension witnesses and specific processes of a QKD Protocol and proves the security of the protocol against collective attacks based on the min-entropy and dimension witnesses.

Security evaluation of quantum key distribution with weak basis-choice flaws

TLDR
This paper evaluates the security of QKD with weak basis-choice flaws, in which the random bits used by Alice and Bob are weakly controlled by Eve, and obtains a tight and analytical bound to estimate the phase error and key rate for both the single photon source and the weak coherent source.

On the security of semi-device-independent QKD protocols

TLDR
This work considers imperfect detectors and establishes the critical values of the security parameters required for guaranteeing security against eavesdroppers with and without quantum memory, and suggests a minimal characterization of the preparation device in order to lower the requirements for establishing a secure key.

Detection loophole attacks on semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols

TLDR
Conditions under which detection inefficiencies can be exploited by a malicious provider to fake the performance of semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols are discussed - and how to prevent it.

Receiver-device-independent quantum key distribution protocols

TLDR
It is shown that a secret key can be established even when the quantum channel has arbitrarily low transmission by considering RDI protocols exploiting sufficiently many states by considering a receiver-device-independent (RDI) model.

Implementations for device-independent quantum key distribution

TLDR
P plausible solutions to overcome the crucial problem of channel loss in the frame of DIQKD physical implementations are described and analyzed.

Security of quantum key distribution with source and detection imperfections

TLDR
This work derives a security analysis which takes both the source and detection imperfections into account, and presents an important step toward the practical security of QKD wit realistic devices.
...