Semantics, cross-cultural style

@article{Machery2004SemanticsCS,
  title={Semantics, cross-cultural style},
  author={Edouard Machery and Ron Mallon and Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={2004},
  volume={92},
  pages={B1-B12}
}

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