• Corpus ID: 244305974

Selling Information in Competitive Environments

  title={Selling Information in Competitive Environments},
  author={Alessandro Bonatti and Munther A. Dahleh and Thibaut Horel and Amir Nouripour},
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information-and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers’ types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the… 

Figures from this paper

Coordination via Selling Information

We consider games of incomplete information in which the players' payoffs depend both on a privately observed type and an unknown but common"state of nature". External to the game, a data provider

Equilibrium and Learning in Fixed-Price Data Markets with Externality

We propose modeling real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers they please, as a simultaneous-move game between the buyers. A key



Selling Information to Competitive Firms

A monopolistic information provider sells an informative experiment to a large number of perfectly competitive firms. Within each firm, a principal contracts with an exclusive agent who is privately

Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets

This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any

Towards Data Auctions with Externalities

It is demonstrated that modeling the utility of firms solely through the increase in prediction accuracy experienced reduces the complex, combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple data sets to an auction of a single digital (freely replicable) good.

Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger

Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers

We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private

Direct and Indirect Sale of Information

The authors compare two methods for a monopolist to sell information to traders in a financial market. In a direct sale, information buyers observe versions of the seller's signal while in an

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal

Markets for Information: An Introduction

We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers, information intermediaries, and

Screening while Controlling an Externality

We propose a tractable framework to introduce externalities in a screening model. Agents differ in both payoff-type and influence (how strongly their actions affect others). Applications range from

Optimal Auction Design

Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.