Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBay

  title={Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBay},
  author={Tapan Khopkar and Xin Li and Paul Resnick},
  booktitle={EC '05},
Analysis of usage history for a large panel of eBay sellers suggests that both seller and buyer behavior change in response to changes in a seller's feedback profile. Sellers are more likely to stop listing items right after receiving a negative feedback. Sellers who continue listing do not seem to improve their performance in order to salvage their reputations. Instead, sellers get more negative feedback after receiving a negative feedback. One reason is that observed negative feedback appears… 

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  • CEPR Discussion Paper No
  • 2004
The Production of Trust in Online Markets