• Corpus ID: 49902545

Self-regulation promotes cooperation in social networks

  title={Self-regulation promotes cooperation in social networks},
  author={Dario Madeo and Chiara Mocenni},
Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the activation of spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms, which may lead them to behave cooperatively, while interacting with others and taking conflicting decisions over time. By extending Evolutionary game theory over networks, we prove that cooperation partially or… 

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