Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge

@article{Bicchieri1989SelfrefutingTO,
  title={Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge},
  author={Cristina Bicchieri},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={1989},
  volume={30},
  pages={69-85}
}
Game theoretic reasoning is sometimes strikingly inconsistent with observed behavior, or even with evidence from introspection. Famous examples of such inconsistency are the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game and Selten’s Chain Store Paradox (Selten, 1978). In both cases, some plausible solutions run counter to game theoretic reasoning and appear to point to the inadequacy of the game theoretic notion of rationality in capturing important features of human behavior. These considerations… 

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