Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge

@article{Bicchieri1989SelfrefutingTO,
  title={Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge},
  author={C. Bicchieri},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={1989},
  volume={30},
  pages={69-85}
}
  • C. Bicchieri
  • Published 1989
  • Erkenntnis
  • 33 Citations
    THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL PLAY IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION
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    The Game Take-or-Play: A Paradox of Rationality in Simultaneous Move Games
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    Alfred schutz, Austrian Economists and the Knowledge Problem
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    Backward Induction without Common Knowledge
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    • 15
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    • 4
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