Self-knowledge: its limits, value, and potential for improvement.

  title={Self-knowledge: its limits, value, and potential for improvement.},
  author={Timothy D. Wilson and Elizabeth W. Dunn},
  journal={Annual review of psychology},
Because of personal motives and the architecture of the mind, it may be difficult for people to know themselves. People often attempt to block out unwanted thoughts and feelings through conscious suppression and perhaps through unconscious repression, though whether such attempts are successful is controversial. A more common source of self-knowledge failure is the inaccessibility of much of the mind to consciousness, including mental processes involved in perception, motor learning… 

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