Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs

@inproceedings{Shogren1997SelfinterestAE,
  title={Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs},
  author={Jason F. Shogren},
  year={1997}
}
Abstract This paper explores whether a bargaining environment with a well-defined institutional structure that compensates rational self-interest for trivial differences in measurable performance will increase self-interest and decrease equitable splits of expected wealth. Employing a face-to-face, first-to-four victories bargaining tournament with non-linearly increasing payoffs, we observe an overall level of 84-percent rational self-interested bargains, and only 4 percent equitable bargains… CONTINUE READING

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