Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions

@article{Wellman2017SelfconfirmingPS,
  title={Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions},
  author={Michael P. Wellman and Eric Sodomka and Amy Greenwald},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2017},
  volume={102},
  pages={339-372}
}
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure problem. Given the gap in understanding of general simultaneous auction games, previous works have tackled this problem with heuristic strategies that employ probabilistic price predictions. We define a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes-Nash equilibrium can… Expand
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