Self-admissible sets

@article{Brandenburger2010SelfadmissibleS,
  title={Self-admissible sets},
  author={Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2010},
  volume={145},
  pages={785-811}
}
Best-response sets (Pearce [27, 1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger-Friedenberg-Keisler [16, 2008]) characterizes “rationality and common assumption of rationality.” We analyze the behavior of SAS’s in some games of interest—Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then… CONTINUE READING