Self-Control at Work

  title={Self-Control at Work},
  author={Supreet Kaur and Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan},
Workers with self-control problems do not work as hard as they would like. This changes the logic of agency theory by partly aligning the interests of the firm and worker: both now value contracts that elicit more effort in the future. Three findings from a year-long field experiment with data entry workers suggest the quantitative importance of self control at work. First, workers choose dominated contracts—which penalize low output but provide no greater reward for high output—36% of the time… CONTINUE READING
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