Self-Censorship in Public Discourse

@article{Loury1994SelfCensorshipIP,
  title={Self-Censorship in Public Discourse},
  author={Glenn C. Loury},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  year={1994},
  volume={6},
  pages={428 - 461}
}
Uncertainty about what motivates “senders” of public messages leads “receivers” to “read between the lines” to discern the sender's deepest commitments. Anticipating this, senders “write between the lines,” editing their expressions so as to further their own ends. I examine how this interactive process of inference and deceit affects the quality and extent of public deliberations on sensitive issues. A principle conclusion is that genuine moral discourse on difficult social issues can become… 

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