Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

@article{Einav2013SelectionOM,
  title={Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance},
  author={L. Einav and Amy N. Finkelstein and Stephen R. Ryan and P. Schrimpf and M. Cullen},
  journal={NBER Working Paper Series},
  year={2013}
}
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting… Expand
325 Citations

Paper Mentions

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Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance.
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Health Insurance for "Humans": Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare
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Moral hazard and selection for voluntary deductibles
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