Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector.

@article{Siciliani2006SelectionOT,
  title={Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector.},
  author={Luigi Siciliani},
  journal={Journal of health economics},
  year={2006},
  volume={25 3},
  pages={479-99}
}
A model of contracting for hospital treatments is presented. For a given diagnosis of the patient, two treatments are available: a high-intensity (surgical) treatment and a low-intensity (medical) treatment. A purchaser (the National Health Service, public or private insurer) offers a contract to the provider (the hospital) to maximise the patients' benefit net of costs. We show that if the average severity of the patient is private information known only by the provider, the hospital has an… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-2 of 2 references

3 In some cases it is optimal to combine the fully prospective price with a linear cost–sharing component (see Ellis and McGuire

3 In some cases it is optimal to combine the fully prospective price with a linear cost–sharing component (see Ellis and McGuire • 1986

Case-Mix Groups (CMGs) and Australian National DRGs (AN-DRGs)

GHMs)

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…