# Selection of nonextremal candidates from a random sequence

```@article{Rose1982SelectionON,
title={Selection of nonextremal candidates from a random sequence},
author={John S. Rose},
journal={Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications},
year={1982},
volume={38},
pages={207-219}
}```
• J. S. Rose
• Published 1 October 1982
• Mathematics
• Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Problems of optimal choice generally invoke monotone preference functions; consequently, optimal strategies consider stopping the sequence only when extremal (best/worst) or nearly extremal candidates are presented. The objective of the present investigation is to select a candidate representative of the entire sequence. In particular, selection of the median object and selection of any object from a set of middle ranks are considered.
7 Citations
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• Mathematics
• 1966
Abstract The classical dowry, secretary, or beauty contest problem is extended in several directions. In trying to find sequentially the maximum of a random sequence of fixed length, the chooser can
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Within the conventional framework of the so-called secretary problem, we introduce two decision makers, one of whom is dominant. The objectives are to select the two best objects and immediately to
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