Selection of nonextremal candidates from a random sequence

@article{Rose1982SelectionON,
title={Selection of nonextremal candidates from a random sequence},
author={John S. Rose},
journal={Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications},
year={1982},
volume={38},
pages={207-219}
}
• J. S. Rose
• Published 1 October 1982
• Mathematics
• Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Problems of optimal choice generally invoke monotone preference functions; consequently, optimal strategies consider stopping the sequence only when extremal (best/worst) or nearly extremal candidates are presented. The objective of the present investigation is to select a candidate representative of the entire sequence. In particular, selection of the median object and selection of any object from a set of middle ranks are considered.
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