Selection-based Approach to Cooperative Interval Games

@article{Bok2014SelectionbasedAT,
  title={Selection-based Approach to Cooperative Interval Games},
  author={Jan Bok and Milan Hlad{\'i}k},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2014},
  volume={abs/1410.3877}
}
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of the interval game with no additional uncertainty. We introduce new selection-based classes of interval games and prove their characterization theorems and relations to existing classes based on the interval weakly better operator. We show a new results regarding… 

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    ArXiv
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N ov 2 01 8 On convexity and solution concepts in cooperative interval games

  • Jan Bok
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • 2018
In this paper, convexity, core and the Shapley value of games with interval uncertainty are studied to capture which properties are preserved when concepts from classical cooperative game theory to interval games.

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