Selection Effects and Deterrence

  title={Selection Effects and Deterrence},
  author={James D. Fearon},
  journal={International Interactions},
  pages={29 - 5}
  • J. Fearon
  • Published 1 January 2002
  • Business
  • International Interactions
The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self… 
Deterrence theory: where do we stand?
Abstract Although deterrence theory was a central focus in the study of International Relations during the Cold War, attention has shifted away from deterrence since the end of that conflict.
Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory
The stage has now been set: in the first chapter, I argued that our understanding of general deterrence is hampered in part because of a divide between formal theories and the empirical analyses of
Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations
xtended deterrence characterizes situations where one state (for conveE nience, the defender) seeks to prevent another state (the challenger) from attacking a third state (the proteg6). The defender
The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda
In this paper, I aim to review recent empirical and theoretical developments in the study of deterrence. I suggest that an emerging wave of literature currently represents a revival in this field.
Selection Effects and Economic Sanctions
Several scholars have tried to import arguments about selection effects from the literature on deterrence crises into the context of studies of economic sanctions. They claim that datasets of
Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics
ABSTRACT The increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness and the related security concerns associated with the Eastern Flank of NATO caused a revival of interest in European deterrence after more
Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes
Drawing on arguments about the domestic political costs of using force and the ability of states to signal resolve, we develop a selection effects-based model of militarized interstate dispute
Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail
Abstract Do nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars
General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory
Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of
The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions
  • N. Miller
  • Political Science
    International Organization
  • 2014
Abstract Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects


Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies
Rational deterrence is a more successful theory than portrayed in this literature, and it remains the only intellectually powerful alternative available.
DETERRENCE: The Elusive Dependent Variable
THE testing of theory in international relations requires clearly articulated assumptions, the specification of scope conditions, rigorously formulated propositions, appropriate tests, and a valid
Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis
Newly revised in the light of the renewed debate of the last five years, this second edition of Patrick Morgan's book is a comprehensive review of the logic and the practice of deterrence. Morgan
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
This study builds on earlier work on extended (third-party) immediate deterrence. We analyze fifty-eight cases and summarize previous findings that extended deterrence is likely to succeed when the
Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter
Deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior. They generally assume that would-be initiators are (i)
International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition†in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers audience
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Conventional wisdom holds that in international disputes, a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or the balance of interests.
Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference
There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
The use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics. Force, or the threat of force, may be used either to change the status quo or to
Rationalist explanations for war
Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very