Selecting equilibria in common agency games

  title={Selecting equilibria in common agency games},
  author={David Martimort and Lars Stole},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution schedules. We prove that under complete information, payoff vectors of equilibria with truthful schedules coincide with the set of smooth equilibrium payoffs, including non-truthful schedules. We next consider whether the presence of arbitrarily small amounts of asymmetric information is enough to refine this payoff set. Providing that the extensions of the… CONTINUE READING

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