Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?

@inproceedings{Edelman2011SelecticaRT,
  title={Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?},
  author={Paul H. Edelman and Randall S. Thomas},
  year={2011}
}
Since their invention in 1982, shareholder rights plans have been the subject of intense controversy. Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively “poison pills,” enable a target board to “poison” a takeover attempt by making it prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage of the target company’s stock (until recently 15-20%). Not surprisingly, some commentators view rights plans as an inappropriate means of shifting power from shareholders to the board… CONTINUE READING

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