Seigniorage and Political Instability

@article{Cukierman1989SeigniorageAP,
  title={Seigniorage and Political Instability},
  author={Alex Cukierman and Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini},
  journal={Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal},
  year={1989}
}
The importance of seignorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication of this paper is that countries with more unstable and polarized political systems rely more heavily on seignorage. This result is obtained within the context of a political model of tax reform. The model implies that the more unstable and polarized the political system, the more inefficient is the equilibrium tax structure (in the sense that tax… 
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