Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies

@article{Cassell2011SeekingST,
  title={Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies},
  author={Cory A. Cassell and Shawn X. Huang and Juan Manuel S{\'a}nchez and Michael D. Stuart},
  journal={Microeconomics: Intertemporal Firm Choice \& Growth},
  year={2011}
}

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