Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random-Oracle Model

@article{Don2019SecurityOT,
  title={Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random-Oracle Model},
  author={Jelle Don and Serge Fehr and Christian Majenz and Christian Schaffner},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year={2019},
  volume={2019},
  pages={190}
}
The famous Fiat-Shamir transformation turns any public-coin three-round interactive proof, i.e., any so-called \(\Sigma {\text {-protocol}}\), into a non-interactive proof in the random-oracle model. We study this transformation in the setting of a quantum adversary that in particular may query the random oracle in quantum superposition. 

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